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Abstract: Starting from the premise that popular support is increasingly a necessary 
condition for European Union initiatives, this paper utilizes the concept of solidarity to 
attempt to better specify the nature of “we feeling” in Europe and its relationship to 
support for institutionalized collective action through the EU. Building on the 
Europeanization literature’s examination of the socialization of individuals toward 
European norms, the paper distinguishes between shared identities and common fate, 
arguing that the literature has tended to privilege the former over the latter. Using recent 
Eurobarometer public opinion surveys, this paper explores the different measures of 
identity and common fate and their apparent relationship to support for collective action 
across a range of issue areas. 
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There is no reason to assume that the emergence of a sense of political solidarity must 
come to halt at the frontiers of the nation-state. Why shouldn’t the empty shell of the 
European citizenship, which has been established for some time, become filled in a 
similar way with the awareness that all European citizens now share the same fate? 
Jürgen Habermas, Europe: Faltering Project 
 
The determinants of collective action are very much of the moment for a European Union 
in crisis. During the sovereign debt imbroglio of 2010-2011—beginning with Greece and 
spreading to Ireland, Portugal, and beyond—the capacity and willingness of Europeans to 
act collectively to deal with skeptical bond investors have been sorely tested. German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, and other leaders have 
cited European solidarity as necessitating collective action to ensure the survival of the 
single currency and, in the eyes of some, the European Union itself. Indeed, 
proclamations of solidarity are a pervasive among the statements of European leaders, 
from Schuman and Monnet to the Lisbon Treaty’s solidarity clause. Are such 
declarations merely rhetoric used by luminaries in the European firmament, or do they 
reflect a reality of popular “we-feeling” in Europe that can facilitates collective action, 
particularly but not limited to times of crisis, in the European Union? 
 Starting from the premise that popular support is increasingly a necessary 
condition for European Union initiatives (whether financial rescues or other), this paper 
utilizes the concept of solidarity to attempt to better specify the nature of “we feeling” in 
Europe and its relationship to support for institutionalized collective action. Building on 
the Europeanization literature’s examination of the socialization of individuals toward 
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“European” norms, the paper draws a connection between the concept of we feeling first 
articulated by Deutsch (1957) and older conceptions of solidarity that distinguish 
between shared identities and common fate, arguing that the literature has tended to 
privilege the former over the latter. Using recent Eurobarometer public opinion surveys, 
this paper explores the claim that a firm popular basis of present and future EU initiatives 
depends less on Europeans’ sense of a shared identity and more on their sense of 
interdependence and indivisibility—that their own security and prosperity is so closely 
tied to that of other Europeans that they cannot enjoy the benefits of interdependence 
unless they also accept its costs. 
 
Europeanization from the bottom up 
The Europeanization literature developed over the past 15-20 years as a successor to the 
longstanding debate between the neofunctionalists and liberal intergovernmentalists 
regarding the central dynamics driving European integration. As many scholars have 
noted (Wallace 2000; Cowles et al. 2001; Olsen 2002; Checkel 2005 (passim); Flockhart 
2010), Europeanization has come to mean a variety of different things in different 
contexts. Of primary interest here are the determinants of and prospects for EU-level 
regimes that sustain presumed, iterated collective action among the member states, 
supranational institutions, and, not least, the peoples of Europe.1 
                                                 
1 This definition of Europeanization adheres most closely to that of Risse et al. (2001, 3) as the “emergence 
and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance…associated with political 
problem-solving that formalize interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing the 
creation of authoritative European rules.” It is thus closer to what Wallace (2000) and Flockhart (2010) call 
“EU-ization”—emphasizing less the long-term historical construction of “Europe” and “Europeans” than 
what Olsen 2002 referred to as “the organizational capacity for collective action.” 
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 Drawing on the sociological and constructivist premise of the mutual constitution 
of agents and structures,2 the primary thrust of the Europeanization literature in recent 
years has been to emphasize the socialization of member states and national political 
leaders to European norms and practices, which can feeds back to the dynamics of EU-
level coordination. As scholars have noted (Checkel 2001; Risse et al. 2001; Börzel 
2002), there is interesting variation in what Olsen (2002) referred to as the “central 
penetration of national systems of governance”—i.e., the extent to which European 
Union member states conform to harmonized European regulatory, institutional, and 
social standards or retain their diversity on these fronts. There is also variation in the 
degree of socialization of national political leaders to European Union norms and roles, 
which, if these norms and roles are internalized, tend to feed back into more robust EU-
level collective action (Checkel 2005, passim). A key theme in this literature is the gap 
between the socialization of European elites and masses. While national political leaders 
interacting in the European Council may or may not internalize European roles (Beyers 
2005), the more intense dynamics of socialization and greater “entativity” (Risse 2003) 
among political and other elites more generally tend to reaffirm the status of the 
European Union as an elite project. Indeed, work on the formation of transgovernmental 
policy networks within Europe (Newman 2008; Slaughter 2004) tends to reaffirm the 
elite-centered dynamics of European integration, whether through vertical or horizontal 
networks.  
Yet even if the European Union does not suffer from a fundamental democratic 
deficit (Moravcsik 2004), in the face of elite-negotiated and publicly unpopular deals to 
                                                 
2 Schimmelfennig 2001, for one, addresses Europeanization (in his case, enlargement) from a more rational 
choice perspective. 
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rescue fiscally incontinent member states, the question of mass support for EU collective 
action is essential to the long-term viability of the EU. More than fifty years ago, Deutsch 
(1957) noted that, “without the steady acceptance by large numbers of people, 
compliance is bound to be ineffective or temporary”—and thus one must consider the 
popular contribution to presumed, iterated collective action. Indeed, institutional 
innovations over the past thirty years have given the public more of a voice (and veto) 
over EU collective action—including ever-increasing co-decisionmaking power for the 
directly elected European Parliament, expanding scope for qualified majority voting in 
the Council (which gives greater voice to member states with larger populations), and 
continuing potential for popular rejection of EU treaties through national referenda. 
Moreover, the soft-law oriented Open Method of Coordination and the invitation to 
public participation in the constitutional convention (see Risse & Kleine 2007), are 
relatively recent innovations intending to give the public more of a direct voice in 
European affairs. Though a 2009 Eurobarometer survey suggested that a majority of all 
Europeans is reasonably satisfied with how democracy works in the European Union, the 
EU’s institutional evolution will likely imply greater sensitivity to the popular will, thus 
requiring a deeper understanding of the role that public support (or lack thereof) plays in 
European collective action.3 
Within the Europeanization literature, several scholars have addressed the 
question of the extent to which socialization toward European norms occurs at the 
popular, rather than the elite, level. One angle taken is that of mutual trust, which 
according to international relations theorists (Keohane 1986) is necessary for reciprocity 
                                                 
3 When asked about their satisfaction “with the way democracy works in the European Union,” 54 percent 
of all Europeans answered that they were “very” or “fairly” satisfied (Eurobarometer 72). 
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and cooperation between countries. To what extent to does transnational exchange and 
interaction lead to greater trust among Europeans? Delhey (2007) sees a mixed picture: 
international trust has grown particularly among northern and western Europeans, though 
more slowly elsewhere—with enlargement to the south and east tending to erode 
somewhat the aggregate levels of trust in the EU. Genna (2009) addresses the trust issue 
from a more micro perspective, arguing that individuals look to the policy positions of 
“trustworthy” member states (such as Germany) in forming their attitudes toward EU 
policy initiatives. Yet citizens’ trust in different European institutions (as opposed to one 
another) have been quite stable since the late 1990s: in the low 50s for the European 
Parliament; in the mid-to-high 40s for the European Commission and European Central 
Bank; and in the low 40s for the European Council. While these figures do not suggest 
supreme confidence in the EU, they tend to compare favorably to reported levels of trust 
in national governments, whose support generally ranged in the 30 to 35 percent range.4 
Perhaps more relevant to the question of public support for EU collective action is 
the degree to which citizens identify with Europe—with the basic expectation that greater 
identification with Europe in general and the EU in particular presages greater support for 
European collective action.5 A variety of scholars—including Eichenberg and Dalton 
(1993), Rorschneider (2002), and Citrin and Sides (2004)—have identified the 
complexity of the relationship between citizen identification with Europe and support for 
EU integration, particularly given that Europeans tend to possess multiple (local, 
national, and European) identities. Risse (2003) claims that initiatives such as the single 
currency can increase the “entativity” of the EU for European citizens, and thus increase 
                                                 
4 Eurobarometers 72 (2009), 70 (2008), 68 (2007), 66 (2006), 64 (2005), 58 (2002), and 52 (1999).  
5 Smith (1992), for one, is more skeptical about the prospects for and implications of a European identity. 
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their identification with (and perhaps support for) the EU. Mayer and Palmowski (2004), 
for their part, add further dimension to the identity puzzle, addressing the question of 
Europeans’ identities less in terms of national versus European than in terms of more 
abstract categories (historical, cultural, institutional, etc.—see also Flockhart 2010). 
Yet one need not address European citizens’ identification with the European 
Union solely from the vantage point of top-down, socialization dynamics—i.e., the 
intentional construction of a European identity among citizens by elites. Risse (2003) also 
addresses identity as an independent variable, claiming that variation in individuals’ 
adherence to sense of a strong, positive national identity helps explain their varying 
support for EU integration—which may explain, for instance, relatively persistent British 
Euroskepticism vis-à-vis member states such as Germany and Italy. Yet Hooghe and 
Marks 2004 have shown that citizens with an exclusive national identity (i.e., people that 
deny having any identification with Europe) are significantly more likely to support 
European integration. Therefore, in a context such as Europe in which identities are 
multiple and sometimes competing, identification with Europe, in the words of Olsen 
(2002, 928), provides “vague guidelines for action.” It remains unclear when 
identification with Europe trumps national identity—or whether the latter is a hindrance 
or boon to EU collective action. 
 
We-feeling in Europe: Solidarity, identity, and indivisibility 
Scholars’ utilization of Deutsch’s concept of we-feeling has, understandably, tended to 
focus on the question of individuals’ identities and self-association with a broader 
community (“we”) and, perhaps, in contrast to an identifiable “other.” Yet the concept of 
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we feeling does not lead inevitably to a focus on trust or identity; rather, in his definition 
of we feeling, Deutsch emphasized “partial identification in terms of self-images and 
interests.”6 The liberal intergovernmentalist literature in particular has addressed 
European integration from the perspective of national and pressure group interests, and 
Hooghe and Marks (2004, 416) have shown that “citizens who feel confident about the 
economic future—personally and for their country—are likely to regard European 
integration in a positive light.” Yet we still have a limited conception of how individual 
Europeans’ perceptions of their self-interest within the multiple communities in which 
they are embedded—national and European—affect the prospects for European Union 
collective action.  
To capture this combination of “self images and interests” we need to consider a 
related concept that captures both: solidarity. As noted earlier, European leaders have 
often cited solidarity not only to refer to common sympathies among the peoples of 
Europe but to proclaim that such sympathies would be the basis of collective action. But 
what leverage does the concept of solidarity—a shared sense of unity, integration, and 
common fate among a given community—provide beyond that of identity? What does 
solidarity mean when that community is international? And ultimately what relationship 
is discernible between solidarity and collective action in the European Union? 
 The classical treatment of solidarity comes from Durkheim (1947), who identified 
“sentiments of sympathy” among individuals to be a function of the “continuous 
                                                 
6 Deutsch (1957, 36) on we feeling: “The populations of different territories might easily profess verbal 
attachment to the same set of values without having a sense of community that leads to political integration. 
The kind of sense of community that is relevant for integration…turned out to be rather a matter of mutual 
sympathy and loyalties; of ‘we-feeling,’ trust, and mutual consideration; of partial identification in terms of 
self-images and interests; of mutually successful predictions of behavior, and of cooperative action in 
accordance with it—in short, a matter of a perpetual dynamic process of mutual attention, communication, 
perception of needs, and responsiveness in the process of decisionmaking.” 
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repartition of different human endeavors”—i.e., a deep division of labor among 
individuals within a community begat solidarity among them. Durkheim claimed that 
such a division of labor only developed within more complex or advanced societies—
those in which high levels of cooperative interaction both resulted from and facilitated 
the realization of “useful complementarities” among them. Given its connection to such a 
division of labor, Durkheim understood solidarity to be useful or functional: as distinct 
but complementary individuals realized these useful complementarities, they came to 
share a sense of common fate and incentives to collaborate to attain their common 
goals—a solidarity that was not only affective (emotional) but also effective (generative 
of collective action). In other words, while a shared identity provides “vague guidelines 
for action,” a shared sense of common fate within a community can, hypothetically, 
foster a sense of “enlightened self-interest” in supporting institutionalized collective 
action to address the common problems of interdependent peoples.  
The European Union has all of the characteristics Durkheim attributed to modern, 
or organic, solidarity.7 The first attribute is a large population: with nearly 500 million 
citizens, the EU is the world’s third largest polity after China and India. The second 
attribute, high levels of (economic) interdependence, is one that the European Union has 
in abundance: trade with fellow EU member states ranges from roughly 52 percent 
(Malta) to nearly 90 percent (Luxembourg) of total trade.8 Third, the EU has relatively 
strong, restitutive (supranational) institutions in the form of the European Commission, 
                                                 
7 Durkheim’s other category was mechanical solidarity, which existed in societies with a small population, 
with low levels of interdependence among the people, an in the presence of punitive institutions and an 
authoritarian, religious, and hierarchical “conscience collective.” 
8 Figures from 2005, drawn from the European Commission website, 
http://europa.eu/abc/keyfigures/tradeandeconomy/tradingpower/index_en.htm#chart31, accessed 10 
January 2011. 
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European Parliament, and European Court of Justice (and more generally in the 160,000-
odd pages of the acquis communitaire). The final element of organic solidarity involves a 
democratic, secular, and individualistic “conscience collective”; these values are clearly 
in evidence in the preambles to the various EU treaties, the emphasis on humanistic 
rather than religious values in the bygone constitutional treaty, and the Copenhagen 
criteria for potential new members.  
Evidence of European solidarity is not limited to elite-level policy initiatives. 
European citizens’ answers to three questions in particular from the autumn 2009 
Eurobarometer survey offer indications of general sentiments of solidarity. When asked 
whether the concept of solidarity brings to mind a positive or negative image, 84 percent 
of Europeans identified it as positive. When asked whether they agree with the statement, 
“What brings the citizens of the different [European] countries together is more important 
than what separates them,” 75 percent of Europeans answered affirmatively. And when 
asked which values “best represent the European Union,” solidarity was the sixth most 
identified value among all Europeans—polling higher than individual freedom, equality, 
and tolerance. What these results suggest is that, on the whole, Europeans value solidarity 
in the abstract, feel solidarity toward one another, and generally view the European 
Union as an embodiment of this solidarity. 
Among the traits that make the European Union sui generis is that, as envisioned 
by Robert Schuman and his successors, it is an institutional manifestation of solidarity 
among nations—a sentiment that international relations theorists have generally ignored.9 
                                                 
9 During the decades immediately after World War II, Deutsch was very much in the minority among 
international relations scholars in discussing the possibility that international solidarity fostered 
cooperation. Prominent mid-20th century scholars such as Carr (1939) and Morgenthau (1978) blamed the 
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Deutsch, for his part, was primarily concerned with the role of we-feeling in promoting 
peaceful resolution of disputes; here the concern is more with coordination to deal with a 
broader range of shared problems Europeans face, from collective defense to regional 
development—and, given the current spate of financial crises and the longer-term 
challenge of responding to global competition, economic security. Ruggie (1992) 
suggests that a condition enabling collective action among nations is indivisibility—the 
shared belief that one cannot enjoy peace and prosperity unless all those within the 
community do.10 Indivisibility reflects a status-quo orientation, emphasizing potential 
threats, endogenous or exogenous, to the integrity of the community and the individuals 
within it; indivisibility in action involves the explicit or implicit promise of assistance to 
an unspecified victim in the face of an unspecified threat.11 Such a promise is not 
altruistic: individuals and governments make it based on the knowledge that they might 
be the ones seeking assistance from their fellow community members in the face of 
unforeseen shocks—and thus that contributing to collective action is in their enlightened 
self interest. Thus the concept of indivisibility captures the self-interest-within-an-
international-community aspect of we feeling that, together with shared identities, can be 
said to comprise solidarity among the nations of Europe.  
The European Union has a variety of institutional manifestations committing its 
peoples to indivisibility-based mutual assistance in different areas. The vast majority of 
                                                 
unscientific nature of Wilsonian idealism, which included references to solidarity in international public 
opinion, for the weakness of Western responses to the rise of totalitarianism between the world wars. 
10 Ruggie claimed that multilateral institutions such as the UN Security Council and NATO were built 
based on the principle of the indivisibility of security in the postwar world. He claimed that indivisibility 
was “a social construction, not a technical condition: in a collective security scheme, states behave as if 
peace were indivisible and thereby make it so.” 
11 Perhaps include here re causality: Ruggie 1998 on causality:  ideas “fall into the category of reasons for 
actions, which are not the same as causes of actions. Thus the aspiration for a united Europe has not 
caused European integration as such, but it is the reason the causal factors (which presumably include 
bipolarity and economic interests) have had their special effect…” (869) 
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EU member states have committed themselves to formal pledges of security indivisibility 
as NATO members. The European Council created the European Union Solidarity Fund 
in November 2002 to aid victims of natural disasters—a fund that made its largest 
contribution, nearly €500 million, to Italy after the L’Aquila earthquake in April 2009. 
And all EU member states are signatories to the solidarity clause of the 2009 Lisbon 
treaty, committing each to come to the assistance of another that is the victim of either a 
terrorist attack or a natural disaster. In the eurozone, exogenous threats to the finances of 
Greek, Irish, and Portuguese governments in 2010 elicited the creation of the European 
Financial Stability Facility, committing participants to rescue the “victims” of 
international bond markets—despite a prior, explicit pledge in the Maastricht Treaty not 
to bail out members facing a sovereign debt crisis. These examples suggest a strong sense 
of indivisibility at the elite level in Europe. The subsequent section of the paper will 
tackle the question of whether it is present at the popular levels as well. 
The question begged by the discussion to this point is whether manifest 
sentiments of indivisibility are sufficiently robust among European citizens to make 
public opinion a building block rather than a stumbling block for EU collective action 
across a range of issues.12 After all, one could imagine that, while Europeans may have 
some affective sentiments of solidarity toward one another, they may balk at the notion of 
personal and/or national sacrifice if required to make significant material contributions to 
aid other member states and/or citizens. While strong and stable popular support for 
regional aid in member states that are net contributors to the EU budget, such as 
                                                 
12 In this sense, public support is understood to be an increasingly necessary, but not sufficient, condition 
for EU collective action. Similar to Ruggie’s (1998, 869) claim regarding the causal force of ideas, 
sentiments of solidarity and indivisibility “fall into the category of reasons for actions, which are not the 
same as causes of actions. Thus the aspiration for a united Europe has not caused European integration as 
such, but it is the reason the causal factors…have had their special effect.” (Italics in original.) 
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Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands, suggest a solidarity basis for EU collective 
action in the form of longstanding redistributive policies, the negative public reactions—
particularly but not exclusively in Germany, where only one-third of the public supported 
the bailout—to the European Union’s rescue of Greece suggest a more limited 
applicability of solidarity.13  
This public reticence may reflect the element of solidarity based less in self-
images (identity) and more in self-interest and interdependence (indivisibility): their 
interests overlap so extensively with one another—far more so than with people of 
nations outside of Europe—that their self-interest would be harmed even more 
noncooperation. The creation of the bailout fund suggests that political leaders appreciate 
this interdependence—and act based on a palpable sense of indivisibility. The question 
that remains is whether it is perceived by European citizens across a range of endogenous 
and (especially) exogenous threats.  
  
An initial examination of survey data 
This section takes a preliminary stab at analyzing the data available in recent 
Eurobarometer (EB) surveys to measure and examine the relationship among common 
indivisibility, identity, and EU collective action. The data presented are all descriptive, 
and come with couple of caveats. First, there are a variety of limitations in the EB data: 
the survey questions asked in some cases can only capture the desired phenomena 
indirectly, which raises some measurement concerns. Second, questions capturing 
relevant concepts may be asked in some years not others, which raises the problem of 
                                                 
13 “Merkel committed to support the euro, in spite of German public opinion,” MercoPress, 6 January 2011, 
available at http://en.mercopress.com/2011/01/06/merkel-committed-to-support-the-euro-in-spite-of-
german-public-opinion. 
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comparing data from different years (and complicates time series analysis). Future work 
will attempt to minimize the effect of these difficulties and draw statistical inferences 
from the relevant data. 
The outcome of interest, relative citizen support for EU collective action, can be 
measured in terms of the degree to which people support EU-level, as opposed to 
national-level, authority in a set of policy areas ranging from purely exogenous issues 
(defense) to endogenous issues (regional aid), with transnational concerns such as 
terrorism, immigration, and the economy in between.14 Since 2002, average levels 
support for EU-level authority across the member states has risen steadily in all almost all 
areas. (See Figure 1.)  
 
 
 
Support for EU-level authority for dealing with the threat of terrorism has maintained the 
high level it attained in the early 2000s in the wake of major attacks both on the United 
States and within Europe, settling at a roughly 80 percent level; as of 2009, the only two 
                                                 
14 Eurobarometer question: “Do you think decisions should be made by the [nationality] government, or 
made jointly within the European Union: ___.”  
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countries registering below 75 percent support for EU authority regarding terrorism were 
the ones that suffered major attacks, Spain (73 percent) and Britain (63 percent). Levels 
of support for regional aid also remained roughly at par over the period, hovering close to 
the 60 percent range. It was in the areas of defense and immigration that support for EU-
level authority saw notable gains, rising from 48 to 67 percent in the former and from 51 
to 63 percent in the latter. In the area of defense, increases were observed among all 
member states; even the greatest skeptics, the British, saw support for EU-level authority 
rise from the low 30s to the mid 40s by 2009. On immigration, increases were similarly 
observed across all countries, with relatively higher levels of support among countries on 
the Union’s southern and eastern frontiers than in the north and west. More generally, 
when asked in 2009 whether the EU was indispensable in meeting “global challenges” 
like climate change and terrorism, 75 percent of all respondents said they “totally” or 
“tend to” agree, as compared to 16 percent that disagreed. 
In the economic realm, the traditional area of European integration, levels of 
support for EU-level authority also saw increases. Overall approval for EU versus 
national management of the economy rose from 47 percent in 2007 to 57 percent in 2009, 
with levels of support generally (though not uniformly) higher among the seventeen euro-
area countries (61 percent) than non-eurozone states (52 percent).15 Perhaps 
counterintuitively, despite the global nature of the financial crisis of 2008—which 
contributed to subsequent debt crises among eurozone members—Europeans have overall 
become more sanguine about globalization; nevertheless, they continue to see the EU as 
having an important role in mediating global market forces—with a plurality of 46 
                                                 
15 Among eurozone countries, Finland was an anomaly with only 32 percent support for EU authority. 
Among non-eurozone countries, two Baltic republics, Lithuania (73 percent) and Latvia (68 percent) stood 
out for their high levels of support. 
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percent of Europeans in 2009 agreeing that “the European Union helps protect us from 
the negative effects of globalization.”  
The most recent Eurobarometer survey (EB74—autumn 2010), which focuses on 
the EU’s response to financial crises and Europe 2020 priorities, offer further evidence of 
Europeans’ support for supranational economic management. When asked which 
governance entity was most capable of managing financial crises in general, a plurality 
cited the European Union—notably higher than the International Monetary Fund, Group 
of 20, and (especially) their national governments—and a plurality also generally 
believed that the EU had acted effectively during the financial crises (again, higher than 
national governments). Overall, a two-to-one majority (46 to 23 percent) agreed that the 
European Union was “going in the right direction…to exit the crisis and face the world 
[sic] new challenges.” This support was not limited to general questions: when asked 
about specific policy prescriptions on the current and future EU agenda, large majorities 
supported greater EU authority for regulating financial services (71 percent), going after 
tax havens (88 percent) and, more comprehensively, promoting “stronger coordination of 
economic policy among all the EU member states” (77 percent). 
Among the components of solidarity, the Eurobarometer surveys provide the most 
direct measures of sentiments of shared identity, though the relevant data are less up-to-
date than others, ending in 2006. In that year, 59 percent declared themselves very or 
fairly proud to be European, as compared with 19 percent that were not (very) proud and 
another 17 percent who did not “feel European.” In 2005, 55 percent of Europeans—
including an absolute majority in each member state bar the Czech Republic (with 49 
percent) and Britain (32 percent)—reported feeling either European only or having a 
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shared national and European identity. In the same year, 57 percent of Europeans 
indicated that they expected to see themselves as either European only or (far more 
likely) a combination of national and European. Although this figure was slightly higher 
than that for a current sense of European identification, in several countries—Denmark, 
Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Hungary, Austria, Portugal, and Finland—people expected to 
have less of a sense of European identity in the future. Meanwhile, when asked in 2006 
whether EU member states shared values, a plurality of 48 percent agreed that they were 
very or fairly close in values—with new member states (58 percent) more affirmative 
than the EU15 (46 percent). 
To begin to connect identification with Europe to support for collective action 
through the European Union, one measure available is the level of attachment to the EU, 
which the Eurobarometer surveys asked in 2002 and again in 2007. In the aggregate, 49 
percent of Europeans (EU27) in 2007 claimed to feel very or fairly attached to the EU, as 
compared to 45 percent of Europeans (EU15) in 2002. This small uptick in attachment to 
the EU was a result primarily of over-time increases within the EU15 rather than the 
influx of enthusiastic new member states; the average levels of attachment among the 
latter in 2007 was slightly below 44 percent—and thus below the EU27 average. 
If a variety of indicators are available to measure citizens’ level of identification 
with Europe and the European Union, there are fewer such indicators of sentiments of 
indivisibility, thus requiring more finesse to capture this phenomenon. The measures 
selected thus far that can be derived from questions in the Eurobarometer surveys 
involved those indicating perceived economic embeddedness in and interdependence 
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with Europe—i.e., those suggesting that individuals perceived their own economic fate to 
be tied to that of other Europeans.  
One angle was to compare citizens’ relative perceptions of the status of the 
domestic economy and the European economy—with a smaller difference between the 
two indicating a greater sense of embeddedness. Data were available to calculate mean 
values of perceived national embeddedness in the EU economy only in 2006-2009; 
overall, the EU27 mean shrank from 12 in 2006 to 6 in 2009, consistent with a sense of 
increasing embeddedness. (The values reported are the absolute values of the difference 
between the percentage of people responding that the current situation of the national 
economy is “good” and the percentage responding that the European economy is 
“good.”) The range, however, was quite large, as small, poorer member states such as 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Portugal each perceived the status of their domestic economy to be 
at least 40 percent worse than the EU’s. Large member states, by contrast, were much 
more likely to see the status of their national economies as roughly similar to that of the 
EU’s: Germans, French, British, Italians, and Spanish all perceived a gap of less than 10 
percent—though so too did smaller members such as Ireland, Finland, Malta, Belgium, 
and the Netherlands. A similar measure, comprising the difference between citizens’ 
perceptions of whether their country and the EU respectively are going “in the right 
direction or the wrong direction,” produced similar results: the EU27 mean difference in 
2009 was 10, with all large member states except France (17) below this mean. What 
these measure may capture at least as much as a sense of national embeddedness in the 
EU, then, is that citizens are aware that the status of the EU economy is particularly 
dependent on the performance of its largest national economies. 
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Another, related measure of indivisibility focuses on the extent to which people’s 
perception of their own household’s financial situation tracks that of the European 
economy. Although this measure usefully targets individual embeddedness in Europe, 
there are limited data available: the survey only asked about people’s expectations 
regarding the European economy in 2008 and 2009.16 In fall 2008, people were slightly 
more optimistic about their personal situation than about the European economy (18 
percent to 16 percent predicted the next twelve months would be better for their 
household and Europe respectively); the following year they were more optimistic about 
both, particularly the European economy (21 and 30 percent respectively). Although little 
can be garnered from two data points, it is worth noting that the mean differences of 2 
and 9 percent are fairly small, suggesting again a certain perception of their household 
situation moving in step with the broader European economy. This perception of course 
is to be expected, however—an improving European economy would as a matter of 
course be associated with some improvement in their personal prospects. 
Although the data at this point are merely descriptive, we can consider very 
preliminarily the relationship among these key variables. A first question is whether 
sentiments of common identity and indivisibility in Europe are related, as we would 
expect if they are to fit together under the overarching concept of solidarity. It is not 
possible to compare the two most relevant indicators, current identification with Europe 
and perception of individual (household) embeddedness in the European economy, within 
the same year; Figure 2 below lays out the EU25 responses for the former from 2006 and 
                                                 
16 Earlier, in 2002, the survey did ask a more direct question capturing something similar: whether their 
country’s EU membership had brought advantages “to you personally.” In nearly all countries, a large 
plurality answered that the EU had brought “as many advantages as disadvantages,” though on average 
those citing “more” or “many more” advantages outpolled those citing “more” or “many more” 
disadvantages nearly two-to-one (27 to 15 percent). 
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the latter from 2009. The arrangement of the data points is at least suggestive of the 
expected negative correlation: as the perceived difference between household and 
European economic status decreases (indicating greater embeddedness), identification 
with Europe increases. Though hardly definitive, the figure provides at least initial 
evidence that these two variables can be considered two elements of the overall concept 
of solidarity.  
 
 
 
The second, more important question involves causality: are one or both 
sentiments of solidarity associated with greater support for EU authority across the issue 
areas outlined earlier in the section? It is to this question that I as yet do not have even an 
initial answer; before such an answer can be attempted I need to compile data on relevant 
control variables for the member states (such as GDP growth rates and per capita income; 
levels of trade with EU partners; various indicators of socioeconomic structure; years of 
EU membership; etc.). Future iterations of this paper will take on these tasks. 
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There is one question in particular, however, that might offer initial insights into 
the relationship between levels of solidarity and support for EU collective action: multi-
speed Europe. When asked in 2006, 2007, and 2009, a small plurality overall indicated 
that it was against “building Europe faster in one group of countries than in the other 
countries.” (See Figure 3.) The fourteen member states in which a plurality supported a 
multi-speed Europe tended to be smaller members—though Italy and Spain were among 
their number—but otherwise represented a range in terms of income levels (e.g., Austria 
and Lithuania), tenure of membership (e.g., Netherlands and Hungary), and geographic 
location (e.g., Denmark and Malta). Alternatively, most of the larger member states—
including Germany, France, and Britain—reported pluralities against multi-speed Europe, 
most notably in Britain (-20) and France (-24).   
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 Yet when it comes to multi-speed Europe, citizens from across the Union seem to 
make a distinction between what is desirable—broadly, a cohesive Europe that moves 
and acts together as a Union of twenty-seven—and what is necessary. When asked in 
autumn 2010 whether they thought “a stronger coordination of economic and financial 
policies among the countries of the euro area” would be an effective means to confront 
the current financial and economic crisis, fully 75 percent of those surveyed responded 
that such coordination would be “very” or “fairly” effective (as opposed to 14 percent 
saying it would not be effective). Although all non-eurozone states saw large majorities 
in agreement, euro area countries were more likely to think such coordination would be 
effective. (See Figure 4.) 
 
Particularly as a euro-area summit meeting in March 2011 looms, in which the seventeen 
member states using the euro are likely to approve new rules on fiscal coordination and 
perhaps tax harmonization, so too looms a question for European leaders and publics 
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alike: when Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy proclaim the need for solidarity-based 
collective action, to whom are they referring? As long as only a subset of Europeans use 
the single currency, bearing the lion’s share of both the benefits and costs of 
interdependence that come with it, it is possible that a sense of indivisibility and common 
fate—and thus support for EU-level collective action—will diverge between the “ins” 
and the “outs.” 
 
Conclusion 
With the European Union facing an uncertain medium-term future—in particular, with 
the likely future default of one or more eurozone states and the possible mortality of the 
single currency—it is essential to consider all factors relevant to the question of what 
conditions are necessary to sustain presumed, iterated collective action. Among the many 
factors that make the European Union sui generis is that it features an established sense 
of solidarity among nations—a factor that is either fleeting or absent among most other 
nations—that can facilitate collective action to respond to the problems of 
interdependence. As this paper has attempted to show, we need to understand this 
solidarity as a phenomenon that is only partly a function of a shared sense of European 
identity, the favored focus of many in the Europeanization literature, which appears to 
remain limited among the European masses despite the efforts of elite socialization. 
Rather, solidarity consists perhaps even more of a sense of common fate or 
indivisibility—of Europeans recognizing that they are swimming in the same tide, which 
can either keep them afloat together or run them aground together. This indivisibility is 
neither altruistic nor affective; it implies that Europeans are stuck together, for better or 
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worse, so they might as well try to work together to meet a range of internal and external 
challenges—even if it means bailing out profligate member states or, from the opposite 
angle, imposing unpopular austerity measures to satisfy your creditors. 
  To properly understand the extent and nature of the role that solidarity and 
indivisibility play in facilitating collective action in the European Union, two advances 
are necessary. First, it is essential to specify more clearly how we measure indivisibility. 
Limitations in the data are a constraint, but it is possible to consider areas other than 
perceived economic interdependence as relevant to a general sense of indivisibility—and 
particularly as a factor relevant to EU collective action on non-economic issues such as 
terrorism and defense. Second, there is of course a difference between public support for 
EU collective action and collective action itself. Though bridging this gap will likely 
remain beyond the scope of this paper, we need to understand how changing public 
sentiments interact with an evolving EU institutional architecture that, on the whole, 
continues to move toward giving greater emphasis to sensitivity and accountability to the 
popular will—and to understand the effects that both will have on the input and output 
legitimacy of the European Union more generally. 
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